We estimate hazard rates of retirement entry as a function of the option value of work. The individuals' expectations about the future economy are incorporated in the option value of work, through which they can impact on the timing of retirement entry. In a scenario where individuals expect a strong upturn, the annual hazard rate of retirement entry (average 8.4%) is reduced by 6.0% or half a percentage point compared to a scenario where they expect a downturn. Had individuals been able to anticipate the Global Financial Crisis, the mere expectation of this downturn would have increased retirement entries by 8.7%.
Introduction
In 2006, Australia experienced the height of an extraordinary boom in the mining sector that resulted in excellent conditions at the labour market as well as the capital markets.
The average rate of return on private pension funds in Australia was near 14% and would stay there the following year (APRA (2013) ). An employed person near retirement age who had to decide whether to leave the workforce immediately or stay in employment, for example, for another two years, could increase his total retirement savings by more than a third when opting for the latter. Two years later in 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began to unfold, and although its impact in Australia was less severe than in many other parts of the world, the situation in the capital markets changed fundamentally. The average rate of return on private pension funds was -8.1% in 2008 and further shrank to -11.5% in 2009. An average worker near retirement age facing the same decision as his colleague did two years earlier, would have lost about a quarter of his retirement savings by delaying retirement entry by two years. Such a difference in economic circumstances, if anticipated, should matter to both workers' decisions. This paper analyses how strongly such anticipated economic circumstances might impact on individuals retirement decisions.
The GFC hit the world unexpectedly, and thus neither worker could have incorprorated its impact into his decision making process. Previous analyses of unexpected changes in retirement wealth due to the development in the capital markets find them to have small effects on retirement behviour. Coile and Levine (2011) find that the GFC's impact on retirement wealth caused only a small delay in retirement entries, and this effect was more than outweighed by the impact of rising unemployment rates which pushed workers out of the labour market and into retirement. Their result is supported by Goda et al. (2012) , Hurd et al. (2009) and Coile and Levine (2006) . The first paper analyses stock market data from 2000 to 2008 and does not find a strong relationship between realised stock market returns and retirement intentions. The latter two papers analyse the stock market crash of the early 2000s and similarly find no evidence of a substantial impact on the timing of retirement. However, unexpected shocks on the stock market represent a sudden change in retirement wealth without any effects on expected pension accruals.
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However, what about conditions in the capital markets that are expected? Distinguishing between expected and unexpected capital gains is theoretically important: if leisure is a normal good, an unexpected increase in retirement savings due to large capital gains should increase the probability of retirement entry ex post; at the same time, expected capital gains should make a worker more likely to delay their retirement entry ex ante, in order to receive the capital gain in the first place. That is, expected changes in retirement savings affect not only a worker's wealth level, but also his expected pension accruals when delaying retirement entry. Since Stock and Wise (1990) developed their option value model, numerous empirical studies from many different countries have confirmed their basic finding: when one decides about his retirement entry age, the expected change in retirement income, if retirement entry were to be delayed, is more important than the current wealth level (See Samwick (1998) , Coile and Gruber (2001) , and Gruber and Wise (2004) for a collection of studies from 12 different countries).
The forward-looking nature of the retirement entry decision implies that everyone forms an expectation about his future income. How strongly do expectations of our personal future income streams vary -over time and across individuals -with our expectations about the state of the economy? When calculating option values of work, it is usually assumed that individuals expect to be able to earn the same income from the labour market and the capital market in the future, as they do currently. In reality, the foregone expected income when one decides to retire and start dissaving, instead of accruing and collecting returns on one's retirement savings, can vary quite substantially at different points in time. The risk of job loss varies considerably across the business cycle, and it has been shown that job displacement has a long-lasting, strong impact on an individual's probability of being employed particularly near retirement age (Chan and Stevens (2001) , Davis and von Wachter (2011) ). At the same time, rates of return in the capital markets vary considerably, and are crucial for savings accruals. However, not only do the economic conditions change over time but also different individuals at the same point in time will also form different expectations about the state of the economy for the medium-term future, as some are more optimistic than others and act on these expectations. Puri and Robinson (2007) show how an individuals' level of optimism is indeed related to savings behaviour, investment choices, and expected retirement entry.
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The simplifying assumption of fixed future income in standard option value models ignores optimism and pessimism just as it ignores the business cycle. However, how important are those differences in expectations? Does it really matter much whether a recession or a boom period is coming up, or whether an individual is optimistic or pessimistic? This paper explores the importance of accounting for expectations about the future state of the economy when modelling the timing of retirement. We study the case of Australia, where a mandatory savings scheme, which is dominated by defined contributions plans, implies that the vast majority of workers have retirement savings subject to changes in the capital markets. Australia is ideally suited to study the impact of those changes, because its public pension scheme has very small distortionary effects compared to most other industrialised countries.
1 It is thus possible to study the effects of capital markets on privately funded pension schemes in near isolation from the publicly funded pension scheme, which ensures that the results can be transferred to other countries' institutional framework to the extent that those countries rely on private savings for retirement.
We build on existing studies that apply a reduced-form version of the option value model as it is applied in Gruber and Wise (2004) , in order to model the responsiveness of older Australian workers to changes in their option value of work. We then assume that any worker can be either optimistic, neutral or pessimistic in his expectations about the state of the economy in the next few years. Those expectations about the mediumterm economic future translate into expectations about future rates of return on private pension funds, and thereby impact on the workers option value of remaining at work.
By simulating retirement entry rates given an individual's option value based on their positive or negative expectations about the future, we can map out the possible impact of economic expectations on the retirement decision.
Had people been able to forecast the impending growth slowdown of the GFC, it would have led to a 9% increase in exit rates from employment to retirement. This is the first paper of its kind, identifying the statistically and economically significant effect of economic expectations on the retirement entry decision using nationally representative household panel data. Given that the 20 years of unprecedented continual growth have now come to an end in the aftermath of the GFC, the importance of changing expectations on the margin is likely to increase for retirement decisions.
Institutional background
Australia's retirement system is two-tiered. The tax-funded, means-tested Age Pension is designed to ensure a basic living standard and prevent poverty in old-age and is available for all Australian residents at age 65.
2 The age of eligibility was previously 60 years for women, but has been increased in half-year intervals since 1995, first affecting the birth cohort of 1935. For the cohorts born on or after 01 January 1949, the age of eligibility is the same for men and women. Beginning in 2017, the age of eligibility will be increased further in half-yearly steps until it reaches age 67 for pensioners born on or after 1 January 1957. The maximum payment rate per fortnight is A$842.80 for singles and A$1270.60 3 for couples, and is increased in line with average wage growth over time. 4 The payment does not depend on past labour market history or current labour market activity, but is determined by an individual's or couple's income. The full pension is paid to singles (couples) with earnings of up to $156 ($276) per fortnight; if the income exceeds that threshold, the pension is reduced by $0.50 ($0.25) per dollar of earnings.
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The second pillar of the Australian retirement system is its mandatory savings scheme 'Superannuation Guarantee' (SG); all employees aged 18 or older who earn at least $450 per month are covered by the SG. Employers pay at least 9% of employees' wages in an approved superannuation fund chosen by the employee 6 . Employers as well as employees 2 To qualify for an Age Pension, some other criteria must be met, such as residence in Australia for a total of ten years.
3 All monetary amounts are henceforth expressed in Australian dollars. 4 For comparison, the national minimum wage for fulltime employees (38 hours per week) is $1281.80 per fortnight.
5 Additional asset tests apply. The maximum allowable amount of assets for receiving a full pension is $196,750 for singles and $279,000 for couples, excluding the principal home. For couples or singles who do not own a home, the allowable maximum assets are increased by $142,500. Once those thresholds are exceeded, the fortnightly pension is reduced by $1.50 per $1,000 of excess assets. The assets test and income test are applied separately; the smaller of both resulting pension amounts is paid.
6 Generally, employees have the right to choose the fund that the employer's contributions are paid into, as well as the investment strategy applied by the fund. However, the majority of workers opts for the fund's default investment strategy (Gerrans et al. (2010)) 6 can make additional voluntary contributions. Superannuation contributions are taxed at a flat-rate of 15%, and thus implicitly tax-subsidised for middle and high-income earners.
For low-income earners, government co-payments for voluntary contributions are available. In 2012, total assets held in superannuation funds were about $1,400 billion or 92% of Australia's GDP; Australia ranks fifth in the OECD in terms of its 'pension asset-to-GDP' ratio and thus well above the OECD average (OECD (2013)). The majority of assets is held in defined contribution plans ($906 billion) or hybrids of defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans ($597 billion); pure defined benefit plans are rare and make up less than 5% of total assets held. Benefit payments during the financial year 2013 totalled $50 billion (APRA (2013)). The high prevalence of defined contribution plans in combination with the size of the superannuation scheme, in terms of the near universal coverage as well as the total amount of assets held and benefits paid out, implies that the performance of superannuation funds has a potentially large impact on older Australians' retirement entry decisions.
Estimation Strategy
We estimate hazard rates of retirement entry for discrete data. A dummy variable denotes the event in question, i.e. the retirement entry. The dummy variable is set to one at time t if the person i is not yet observed to be retired in t, but is observed to be retired in t + 1. The decision to retire is assumed to be irreversible, and indviduals are censored after a retirement entry was observed. The model is estimated as a simple logit model with retirement entry as the dependent variable, and a financial incentive measure OV it as the main explanatory variable. We control for 'retirement wealth' V it , a quadratic in age, as well as a vector of sociodemographic control variables X it . Control variables include the individual's health, education, home-ownership status, state dummies and a linear time trend as in (1):
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Constructing the financial incentive measure
The financial incentive measure, the option value of work OV t , is derived from the net present value of the future utility stream from income and leisure (discounted to the current period t) which results from retirement at date r: the 'retirement wealth' V t (r).
The term Y s denotes labour market income in period s in the periods when the individual is still participating in the labour market, i.e. from the current period t until the period immediately before retirement entry, r − 1. The term B s (r) represents benefits in period s for those periods when the individual has already retired, i.e. from the period r until the period of death S. The stream of future retirement income depends on the time of retirement r. How expectations about the future economic development impact on the expected future income during retirement, is described in in detail in the following section.
Following Blundell et al. (2004) , as would be standard in the literature, the parameter β is a discount factor set to 0.03; γ is set at 0.75 to account for risk aversion, while k represents the preference for leisure and is set to 1.5 to reflect that income gained while not working is more valuable than income gained while working. π ts is the probability of survival until period s in period t. The option value of work OV t is the difference between the discounted present value of the expected utility stream when entering retirement at time r * (the retirement entry date which maximizes the utility stream) and when entering retirement immediately at time t, as in:
3.2 Medium-term expectations and future income streams
We assume that individuals who are still participating in the labour market receive earnings if they are employed, and draw unemployment benefits if they are not employed.
Expected income before retirement entry, Y s , is the weighted average of the earnings in period s and the legal unemployment benefits in period s, weighted with the probability of being employed or unemployed in that same period. We assume that an individual 's 7 In what follows, we drop the index i for simplicity.
8 unemployment probability u(s) in period s equals the average age-specific unemployment rate in the years 2001-2011 at the individual's age in s.
The income after retirement is determined by the retirement savings the individual has accumulated by the time of retirement. Individuals do not dissave and keep making contributions to their superannuation accounts while they are still in the labour force. The superannuation account thus continues to grow by the amount of additional contributions that are made, and by the returns that are earned on investing that money. The day the individual retires, superannuation accounts are converted into savings accounts that earn a secure interest payment i ret , which is set to 5.1%. 8 The retiree now begins to withdraw money from this savings account to provide income during retirement. We assume that withdrawals are designed to smooth consumption: at the day of retirement entry, the individual expects to live for a certain number of additional years, and withdraws an amount equal to an annuity that they could withdraw for the remainder of their expected life span, when fully dissaving their superannuation account. The following year, they will update their expected life span, and adjust their withdrawal accordingly. 9 Once the individual's superannuation wealth falls below a certain level, he will become eligible for a government age pension to supplement their income. 
Expectation Scenarios
The model assumes that individuals observe the current rates of return on superannuation in period t, and based on their observation, they form an expectation of the rate of return during the following twelve months: i lf p (s=t). We assume that in subsequent periods individuals expect the rate of return on superannuation to converge to its long-term equilibrium. i lf p (s=t) is high for optimistic individuals and low for pessimistic individuals.
In order to find a plausible 'starting value' i lf p (s=t) for the sequence of expected future rates of return, we divide the entire distribution of observed rates of return on superan-nuation funds (RRS), in three classes: (1) the lowest observed rates of return are what the pessimists assume to determine the medium-term state of the economy, and what they base their behaviour on; (2) optimists behave as if the highest observed rates of return determined the economic reality in the upcoming years; (3) a person with neutral expectations will base his or her behaviour on the middle range of observed rates of return.
The exact size of these classes corresponds to the population shares with optimistic, pessimistic or neutral expectations. If x% of the population have a pessimistic view on the economy, the x% lowest rates of return in that year form the class of rates of return that we assume pessimists expect for the future. Further y% of the population have neutral expectation; thus the next-highest y% of observed rates of return form the middle class, which we assume a person with neutral expectations will base the calculation of his or her option value on. Finally, 100 − x − y% of the population have optimistic views, and the highest 100 − x − y% of realised rates of returns are the class of rates of returns that are relevant for optimistic individuals. The median rate of return within each of those three classes is the value for i lf p (s) for that expectation type, which is assigned to all individuals i in the corresponding expectation type in year s:
The information on rates of returns on superannuation is taken form APRA data, and the population shares with different expectations stem from CASiE data. APRA is a statutory authority that oversees the financial services industry, including most superannuation funds. They publish financial performance indicators including rates of return at the fund-level on an annual basis. This fund-level data allows us to see the entire distribution of rates of return on superannuation RRS, rather than just an average rate.
CASiE is a cross-sectional telephone-survey conducted on a monthly basis. Among questions on the individual's own financial situation and intentions to make major purchases, CASiE also asks respondents about their expectations about the economy as a whole.
Interviewees are asked to make a forecast for the state of the economy on a 5-point scale,
with lower values representing more optimistic views. We define an individual to be op-timistic if they answer '2' or '1', to have neutral expectations if they answer '3', and to be pessimistic if they answer '4' or '5'. Table 1 shows the distribution of individuals with optimistic, pessimistic and medium expectations, which amounts to about one third each for each year.
The reported population shares are then combined with APRA data that informs us on the distribution RRS. This is illustrated in Figure 1 Table 2 .
From this starting point, individuals assume convergence of i lf p (s) towards its longterm equilibrium:
We estimate the rate of convergence by regressing the rate of return in a given year on the rate return in the previous year, using information on average rates of return from 1996 to 2012. This yields i lf p (s) = 0.044 · i lf pbase + 0.232 · i lf p(s−1) , implying a long-term equilibrium of 0.058. The optimist in year 2004 in the above example thus assumes i lf p (s), s=t,...,T will be 14.2%, 7.7%, 6.2% and 5.9% before it converges to its equilibrium of 5.8%.
Those rates affect the expected retirement savings in an individual's superannuation account, which will affect the expected retirement income once the individual retires; the expected rates of return thus are a factor that determines each individual's option value of further work. In order to map out how strongly their retirement entry behaviour might be impacted by their optimism or pessimism, we will first estimate the model in equation (1) to get an estimate of workers' resposniveness to changes in their option value of work. We then simulate different option values for each worker, assuming the worker had optimistic or pessimistic expectations. Based on the behavioural model and the different option values for different economic expectations, we can then predict hazard rates of retirement entry for each individual, assuming the individuals had been optimistic or pessimistic.
Data and Descriptives
We estimate equation (1) 'utility unit' is closely related to the discounted present value of $1 additional income at some point in the future, adjusted for utility from leisure and risk aversion. The average option value declines sharply with age, and at the same time, the population share with an option value of zero increases: the older an individual is, the less utility they can gain from an additional year of work, and the more likely they are to not gain anything at all. 13 Parallel to a decrease in the option value by age, we observe an increase in the probability of retirement entry.
However, these option values are calculated under the assumptions that everyone at every point in time assumes to receive 5.8% returns on his superannuation savings until his death. How does this change when we incorporate the expected sequences of rates of return as described in Section 4? In order to identify whether the financial incentives and the corresponding probability of retirement entry vary across individuals with different expectations on the economy, we need to identify 'optimists' and 'pessimists' in our sample. HILDA does not contain direct information on one's pessimism or optimism, but contains socio-demographic information that can be used to predict their level of optimism. This is described in Appendix B. It is important to note that there is no problem arising from endogneity of one's expectations, as we do not base our analysis on the indvidual's observed personal expectation, but on expectations of people who are similar to him, based on observed characteristics. Table 4 shows socio-demographic characteristics as well as the average probability of retirement entry, the option value of work OV t and the retirement wealth V t for individuals with optimistic, medium or pessimistic views.
Financial incentives are now calculated under the assumptions described in Table 2 and the path of convergence as described in Section 4.
The descriptive statistics for the three groups of individuals paint a mixed picture. As expected, the hazard rate of retirement entry for pessimists is, on average, higher than the hazard rate for those with medium expectations, while their option value of work is lower. However, optimists have again a higher option value of work, but this is not accompanied by a further decrease in the hazard rate. While, as expected, the option value of work appears to monotonically increase with one's optimism, that does not appear to directly translate into a decrease in retirement entry rates. However, differences in the distribution of other characteristics shed some light on this.
First, the option value of work varies across groups not only because of their expectations. When we look at the option values of work that members of an expectation group would have had, had they formed different expectations (their 'counterfactual' option values), we see a monotonically increasing relationship between the option value of work and one's optimisim, but this hypothetical increase within each group is much smaller than the actual observed differences across groups. Optimists differ from pessimists not only in their option value of work -they are also older and enjoy a higher retirement wealth.
If leisure is a normal good and disutility of labour increases with age, hazard rates of retirement entry would be higher for pessimists than they are, were they of the same age and wealth as the optimists.
On the other hand, pessimists are almost twice as likely to be in poor health as the optimists; twice as likely to not have finished high school, and twice as likely to be renting a domicile rather than owning their home. All these factors might also contribute to differences in pessimists' and optimists' hazard rates of retirement entry, regardless of any possible effects of pessimism and optimism on option values of work, and subsequently on retirement entry decisions. In the next section, we present how retirement entry rates differ with the option value if those differences in other observable characteristics are explicitly controlled for.
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Estimation Results
Estimating equation (1) yields the effect of the option value of work on the hazard rate of retirement entry. Table 5 shows the coefficients and marginal effects of the option value for different model specifications. In the column 1, X it is restricted to three dummy variables representing the individuals self-reported health; in column 3 the full set of covariates is included. The coefficient on OV t is negative and highly significant; the higher the option value of work, the lower the probability that an individual retires within the next year.
This result is in line with the international evidence from numerous different countries (Samwick (1998) , Gruber and Wise (2004) ), as well as a recent study by Warren and Oguzoglu (2010) for Australia.
The average marginal effect across all individuals is -0.012, which means that the hazard rate of retirement entry will drop on average by 1.2 percentage points, if the option value of work is increased by 10,000 utility units (=about half a standard deviation, see Table 3 ). The marginal effect is thus not only highly significant, but also economically substantial. Columns 2 and 3 present the coefficients and average marginal effects for two extended versions of the model that also control for education and home ownership, and for state dummies and a linear time trend. The additional controls have virtually no effect on neither the coefficient of the option value, nor its marginal effect.
The impact of expectations
The estimate of the parameters of equation (1) show clearly that greater expected financial gains from further work impact on the timing of retirement entry. But by how much will the option value, and in turn, the probability of retirement entry change, if an individual adopts a more pessimistic or more optimistic viewpoint on the medium-term future? For the simulation of the impact of pessimistic or optimistic interpretations of the current state of the economy, we calculate a 'pessimistic' and an 'optimistic' option value for each indivdiual in the sample, based on the rates of return on the retirement fund market as defined in Section 4. Those counterfactual option values were reported in Table 4 . We then predict hazard rates of retirement entry for both option values of work, 16 using the coefficients from the model presented in the last column of Table 5 . The first panel of Table 6 shows the results.
The predicted retirement entry rate if everyone were to adopt an optimistic view on the medium-term economic future decreases to 8.4%, compared to 8.5% if everyone were to adopt a pessimistic view. The difference in the hazard rates of entering retirement of 0.1 percentage points is statistically significant at the 1%-level. The behavioural impact is thus very small. However, it is important to keep in mind that this is a behavioural response based on nothing but the individual's view of the world. The past and current economic environment, as far as they affect current and past income and savings streams, are controlled in the model through the individual's wealth level. The effect of optimism and pessimism stems purely from the fact that optimists and pessimists deem different parts of the actually observed reality to be representative of the future. The behavioural response is not a response to experienced changes in the economic environment, but purely an effect of the expectations about changes in the economic environment, regardles of whether those expected changes turn out to be realised later on.
Moreover, optimists as well as pessimists take their expectations from the observed rates of return within the last twelve months. One group focuses on the best outcomes that were observed last year, while the other group focuses on the worst outcomes observed last year -but both groups base their future expectations on what has happened last year, leaving no room for major changes of the overall economy, such as large upswings or downturns. Table 2 shows that the variation of rates of return within one year is much smaller than is the variation of rates of return over time. If we want to simulate possible responses to expectations of an economic upturn or downturn, using a rate of return from a 'bad year' and a 'good year' as starting point i lf p (s = 1) is more appropriate. We calculate option values for a 'very pessimistic' scenario, where the option value is based on a rate of return on superannuation funds of i lf p (s = t) = -22.0% in the next year, and then converges towards the long-term equlibrium according to the same path as defined in Section 4; the alternative scenario is 'very optimistic', where the rate of return for the next year is assumed to be i lf p (s = t) = 18.3%. 14 14 The value -22.0% was the 5 th -percentile of rates of return in 2008, the year when the GFC hit its peak; the convergence path is -22.%, -0.6%, 4.3%, 5.4% and 5.7% before the equilibrium is reached. Likewise, The second panel of Table 6 shows predicted retirement entry rates if the expected economic circumstances are 'very pessimistic' or 'very optimistic'. Although both shocks are short, they appear to be sufficient to induce a sizable behavioural response, increasing the average retirement entry rate by 6% from 8.2% to 8.7%. The table also reports the 10-, 25-, 75-, and 90-percentile as well as the median of the predicted propensity of entering retirement in any given year. It appears that the effect of optimism versus pessimism is greater in absolute terms at the upper end of the distribution, but in relative terms, the impact of optimism and pessimism is fairly stable across the distribution. At the 90-%ile of hazard rates of retirement entry, being 'very optimistic' instead of 'very pessimistic' decreases the hazard rate by 6%, at the 10-percentile the same effect is 7%. This is clearly an effect of economic significance. The timing of retirement is a major life decision; it is commonly seen as almost irreversible and depends on an entire lifetime of accumulating earnings and savings. If the medium-term economic outlook, even if it might never be realised, can change the propensity to retire by six to seven per cent, this has to be considered a major effect.
We then investigate a third scenario: what behavioural response would have resulted, if individuals had expected the mining boom and the following GFC? The term i lf p now does not, after one initial shock, converge according to the rate assumed so far, but takes on the average rates of return on superannuation savings that were observed over the period of the mining boom and the GFC, respectively. For the 'mining boom' scenario, i lf p takes on the values of the average rate of return between 2003 and 2007 , and the longterm rate of return of 5.8% immediately thereafter; for the 'GFC-scenario', the average rates of return between 2008 and 2012 are used instead, equally followed by the long-term equilibrium thereafter.
15 The third panel of Table 6 shows the response of retirement entry behaviour, had individuals expected the swing from the mining boom to the GFC.
On average, such a change in expectations would incur a change in the hazard rate of retirement entry of 9% or 0.7 percentage points. Finally, the lowest panel shows the predicted hazard rate of retirement entry for the 'extreme and inert' scenario: the assumed rate of return is initially -22% and 18.3% as in the 'very pessimistic' and 'very optimistic' scenario. However, this scenario assumes that individuals see these rates as very inert; instead of expecting the rate of return to converge to its long-term equilibrium quickly, individuals expect that it will stay as high or as low for a period of five years. The hazard rate is 28% higher when individuals expect such a lasting, major crisis than when they expect a lasting, major boom. Now the effect is stronger at the lower tail of the distribution: at the 10-percentile, optimists are 48% more likely to retire than optimists are; at the 90-percentile the effect is 22%. However, the scenario is extreme, and unlikely to occur in such strength in reality, which in turn means it is not a likely expectation for a majority of reasonable individuals. It is thus to be seen as an upper bound of the impact of economic expectations on retirement behaviour.
Heterogeneity in the response to expectations
In the previous section, we have shown that the impact of expecting a boom or a deep recession on retirement entry is considerable, and appears to vary across the distribution.
The latter fact immediately raises the question which groups are the ones to respond strongly or not at all. There are generally two possible reasons why one individual's behaviour might be more affected by an expected up-coming boom or recession than another individual's behaviour: first, they may differ in how strongly their economic expectations change their option value of work. We would expect that an individual's option value varies the stronger with his expectations, the more superannuation savings he has, given that the rate of return on superannuation savings is the main mediating factor between economic expectations and the option value. That is, we expect stronger behavioural changes for those with high savings when economic expectations change from good to bad, which are likely to be those with high wages and higher education. Second, two individuals whose option values are affected identically by their economic expectations, might still differ in their responsiveness to their option value of work. We would expect that an individuals' responsiveness to financial incentives would change with health and age. Health and age are the two main driving factors of the retirement decision, and the importance of financial incentives should decrease when the 'pressure' to retire increases because of one's age or health.
Heterogeneity in the impact of expectations on the option value
To explore the first source of variation in the impact of economic expectations on retirement entry rates, we split the population in groups according to their wages, superannuation savings and education. Where Table 6 showed changes in the hazard rate of retirement entry for different expectations over the full estimation sample, Table 7 shows the results of the same simulations by sub-groups. As expected, among individuals with no superannuation savings, whether they are pessimistic or optimistic hardly matters for their hazard rates of retirement entry. Had individuals without superannuation savings anticipated the mining boom or the GFC, this anticipation would not have impacted on their behaviour at all.
Even in the very pessimistic or very optimistic scenarios, individuals with no superannuation savings have no reason to change their behaviour: neither do bad economic conditions threaten to reduce their savings, nor can good economic conditions improve them. Instead, we find that the average response as reported in Table 7 is caused predominantly by individuals with high superannuation savings: even in the very "mild" scenario of individual pessimism or optimism within the range of rates of returns observed in one given year, individuals with high superannuation savings are 2.2% less likely to retire when they are optimistic than when they are pessimistic, and when a strong downturn is expected, individuals' retirement entry rate decreases by 12.4% if they have high superannuation savings.
Expecting a situation such as the world experienced during the GFC, increases retirement entry rates by 17.4% compared to an expected boom as Australia experienced it in the early 2000s. The most extreme scenario even shows an increase in the hazard rate of retirement entry of 61.9% for the sub-group with high superannuation savings; however, as stated before, this scenario is an extreme upper bound.
The same patterm is found when looking at low versus high wage earners and indi-20 viduals with and without a tertiary qualification. Economic expectations matter most for those at the upper end of the wage distribution, because these individuals have more savings that can potentially be affected by overall economic conditions, be it positively or negatively.
Heterogeneity in individual's responsiveness to the option value
The second possible reason why the importance of economic expectations varies across the population, is that some individuals will respond more strongly to a change in their expected income streams than others. We would expect one's responsiveness to financial incentives to be the stronger, the less strongly other factors point towards either staying in or leaving the labour force. In the models presented in Table 5 , age and health were unsurprisingly found to be the strongest predictors of retirement entry.
16 Does that mean that young and healthy individuals also respond more strongly to changes in their expectations of future income streams? To analyse this, we have re-estimated the model from Table 5 , column (3), and added interaction terms between age and the option value, as well as interaction terms between the health indicators and the option value. The results from the interacted model suggest that those individuals who are a few years away from the normal retirement age and in good health respond strongly to their expectations of future income streams, whereas old or unhealthy individuals are likely to retire regardless of their financial expectations.
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We would thus expect to see that the 6.0%-change in the average hazard rate of retirement entry when short downturn is expected rather than a short upturn (see Section 6.1), is predominantly driven by a response of healthy workers at an age of a few years before the normal retirement age.
To explore further what role optimism or pessimism plays, given one's other characteristics, we predict hazard rates of retirement entry for 'very optimistic' and 'very pessimistic' individuals as in the second panel of Table 6 , but based on the interacted model from Table 17 and for two different types of individuals:
for an individual in excellent health at age 60, and for an individual in poor health at age 55. Both are expected to have an overall similar retirement entry rate, but different responsiveness to financial incentives. Table 8 shows that for a healthy 60-year old hazard rates of retirement entry are around 8% higher when a downturn is expected, than when an upturn is expected. This is true at all percentiles of the entire distribution of predicted hazard rates. For the 55-year old in poor health, hazard rates for retirement entry are similar to those for the healthy 60-year old: the combined effect of being younger and of being less healthy adds up to about zero, and the propensity to retire is very similar for both groups. However, the response to future income expectations is less than half as strong at 3.7%: men are more responsive in their retirement decision to future income expectations in their early 60s than they are at earlier or later ages, and they are also more responsive when they are in good health. As a result, the less healthy younger individual responds substantially less to future income than his 60-year-old healthy counterpart, and expectations about the medium-term economic development matter less.
To summarize, expectations about the future state of the economy have an economically and statistically significant impact on the timing of retirement, when strong changes in the overall economic situation such as economic upturns and downturns are considered.
'Milder' forms of optimism and pessimism that are based only on variations of rates of return observed within one year have a statistically significant but economically small effect on the decision to enter retirement. The effect of economic expectations unsurprisingly fades in comparison to the effect of age and health itself; however, the behavioural response to optimism and pessimism is not homogenous, and particularly healthy individuals close to the normal retirement age are 7.8% more likely to retire when they expect a strong downturn than when they expect an upturn. Alongside the total savings in one's account in a given wave, HILDA asks respondents about the total employer contributions they receive, as well as about regular, own voluntary contributions; both as a percentage of their salary. Together with information on individuals' salaries and average rates of return on superannuation funds are taken from APRA data, we can extrapolate total superannuation wealth under the assumption that the contribution rates stay constant and the individual receives an average rate of return. Table 9 shows imputed superannuation wealth for the sample of men that was used for the analysis, if positive superannuation wealth was observed in at least one of the waves.
Superannuation Wealth Mean Std. Dev. 25-percentile Median 75-percentile wealth, except for the lower tail of the distribution. However, the option value of work for those with very low private savings will be driven mostly by their salary and Age pension entitlement; whereas the rate of return on private savings will impact the option value of work mostly for those at the upper end of the superannuation wealth distribution. The error that extrapolation of superannuation wealth potentially imposes on the behavioural simulation in this paper, should thus be limited.
B Estimating the probability of being optimistic or pessimistic
Since HILDA data does not contain direct information on individuals' optimism or pessimism (see Section 5), we predict their attitude based on their socio-economic characteristics, and the relationship between those characteristics and one's optimism or pessimism as we observe it in CASiE. Besides individual and general economic expectations, CASiE provides a number of personal characteristics, namely the state of residence, age and gender, occupation and education, household size, income and home ownership. Based on those characteristics, we estimate ordered probit models (separately for each year, for men only) to model the expectations on the state of the economy in the future. The same characteristics that can be identified in CASiE can also be identified in HILDA. Combining the coefficients from the ordered probit models estimated from CASiE, and the individual characteristics observed in HILDA, we can predict the latent variable describing an individual's continuous optimism or pessimism for each individual in the HILDA population.
We sort individuals according to that latent variable, and assign the expectation type 'optimist' to those with the highest and the expectation type 'pessimist' to those with the lowest predicted latent optimism. The expectation types are assigned in such a way that the observed population shares for optimists and pessimists from CASiE are maintained.
18 Table 10 shows the expectation types assigned to each individual in the HILDA sample. Compared to the population shares observed in CASiE, our sample of men aged 55 to 75 contains more pessimists and more optimists, but fewer individuals with neutral expectations. However, the differences between the observed population shares in CASiE and the assigned expectation types in HILDA are small and not systematic.
we assign expectation types to individuals on HILDA based on their personal characteristics, and an ordered probit model of 'economic optimism' estimated on CASiE data.
The estimation was conducted separately by year, for men only. Table 11 shows the coefficients and standard errors, as well as some model information.
18 Note that in order to match the population the CASiE estimates and population shares are based on, the predicted latent optimism is estimated for, and the expectation types are assigned to, the entire HILDA population rather than our sample of men aged 55 to 75. While some of the characteristics that determine one's predicted level of optimism have little change over time (such as occupation and education), others vary more strongly (for example age and household income), as do the models' coefficients. As a result, the same individual might be estimated to be optimistic in one year, and pessimistic in another. 
